



Abstract: Normative political theory was developed in ancient Greece and provided the 
foundations for political research. Its role was never questioned until the rise of logical 
positivism and empirical social science with its claims to be truly scientifi c’ that is, value 
neutral. Th e article starts with a short overview of this controversy and provides an ana-
lysis of the nature of normative theorizing, the structure of a normative argument and 
the role of normative political theory. Th e last section focuses on the problematic rela-
tionship between empirical and normative research. It is argued that political philosop-
hy can be practical, but before it becomes oriented towards practical goals, it should deal 
with purely deductive fact-insensitive principles.
Keywords: normative theory, normativity, political philosophy, political science, logical po-
sitivism
‘[…] it is necessary to appreciate that there are two aspects to political 
theory, traditionally conceived. It involves the analysis of what is poli-
tically feasible on the one hand and of what is desirable on the other’.
C. Kukathas, P. Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, pp. 1–2).
Political science combines the insights and approaches of both the humanities 
and the social sciences. Although today its methods might be predominantly 
empirical, the very foundations of political science have a normative character 
and pertain to the key question in political philosophy: what is a good politi-
cal order? The philosophical insights into the nature of politics laid the foun-
dations for political theories that have developed since the ancient Greek tradi-
tion. Several decades ago, however, the role of these philosophical insights, and 
more broadly, the role of a normative theory of politics, became questionable or 
questioned by numerous political scientists who preferred a neutral empirical 
approach to the study of politics. It was evident that normative political theo-
ry needed some sort of justification and explanation as to what its role and pur-
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pose in such disciplines as political science or international relations might be. 
This article will attempt to address this very question. The first introductory sec-
tion brings a short analysis of the debate on the problematic nature of normati-
ve political theory or political philosophy. The second part provides an analysis 
of the nature of normative theorizing about politics, its role – which is often re-
garded as foundational – and the structure of a normative argument. And the fi-
nal part focuses on the questions of the relationship between empirical research 
and normative theory.
Introduction
There are two different intellectual paradigms in political science: a normati-
ve approach and a ‘positive’ approach. The ‘positive’ paradigm treats the scien-
tific study of politics as associated with a value neutral approach to the subject 
(Gerring, Yesnowitz, 2006, p. 101) and argues that theory can be applied only to 
what is, not to what ought to be. Neopositivists such as Lucien Levy Bruhl clai-
med that science cannot be a science in so far as it is normative. At the advent of 
the behavioural turn in political science Robert Dahl stated:
The empirical political scientist is concerned with what is […] not with what ought 
to be […]. The behaviorally minded student of politics is prepared to describe va-
lues as empirical data; but, qua ‘scientist’ he seeks to avoid prescription or inquiry 
into the grounds on which judgments of value can properly be made (Dahl, 1961, 
pp. 770–771).
And Peter Laslett in his introduction to Philosophy, Politics and Society 
(1956) famously declared that ‘political philosophy is dead’ at least ‘for the mo-
ment’. Its death was largely a consequence of the rise of logical positivism that 
reflected a deep faith in scientific understanding and suggested that proposi-
tions that are not empirically verifiable are simply meaningless. Logical empiri-
cists supported the view that political science, like natural science, must dispas-
sionately study facts for science can only be concerned with ‘what has been, is, or 
will be, regardless of the “oughts” of the situation’ (van Dyke, 1960, p. 192). Such 
a view excluded political philosophy as ‘alleged’ knowledge of the normative. 
A number of political scientists declared that their work was concerned with the 
empirical propositions of political science and not with ‘the value judgments of 
political doctrine’ (Lasswell, 1951, p. xiii).
However, since then a number of scholars not only have been engaged in 
doing normative theory (notably many political philosophers such as Mi-
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chael Oakeshott, Leo Strauss or Hannah Arendt), but have also expressed dis-
satisfaction with ‘the empiricist separation of normative (advocacy-oriented) 
and empirical (explanation-oriented) approaches’ (Shapiro, 1981, p. 5). Af-
ter the publication of John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, political philosophy and 
more broadly normative political theory has gone from strength to strength 
to become recognized again as a valuable or even necessary method of re-
search in political science. This recognition came with the agreement that valu-
es can be seen as the substance of political systems and political structures for 
they play the role of mediators in both prescriptive and descriptive accounts
of politics.
In 1976 Charles Taylor published a celebrated article ‘Neutrality in Politi-
cal Science’ in which he argued, against the prevailing intellectual current at the 
time, that the findings of political science are not and will never be value-free: 
‘a given explanatory framework secretes a notion of good, and a set of valuations, 
which cannot be done away with – though they can be overridden – unless we do 
away with the framework’. Using several examples, including Seymour Lipset’s 
analysis of democracy in his Political Man, he explains that empirical theories 
or supposedly pure assumptions about facts have normative consequences ex-
pressed in statements about what is good or desirable in politics.1 It thus proves 
that a ‘connection between factual base and valuation is built in, as it were, to the 
conceptual structure’ (Taylor, 1994, p. 559). When establishing a framework of 
political analysis, the range of values that can be adopted must necessarily be li-
mited, and thus value orientation cannot be done away with completely. Conse-
quently, ‘to the extent that political science cannot dispense with theory, with the 
search for a framework, to that extent it cannot stop developing normative theo-
ry’ (Taylor, 1994, p. 569).
This position undermines the philosophical claim of neutrality in politi-
cal science, stating that the separation of facts and values is possible. Although 
Taylor’s position could not solve the controversy once and forever, it paved the 
way for critical reassessment of arguments against normative theorizing in po-
litics. Values are central phenomena in political science and international rela-
tions while facts and values are inseparable characteristics of the world as it is 
comprehended by humans. The argument that real political problems can only 
be understood in terms of objective material interests and empirically observab-
le facts needs to be dismissed as providing an inadequate account of political 
1 Taylor brings this illuminating quotation from Lipset: ‘A basic premise of this book is that de-
mocracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their 
ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation. Only the give-and-tak e 
of a free society’s internal struggles offers some guarantee that the products of the society will 
not accumu1ulate in the hands of a few power-holders’ (Lipset, 1994, p. 403).
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inquiry, which cannot be completely separated from normative structures. This 
is especially true in the discipline of international relations where institutional 
facts are often not clearly settled, and reliance on a normative framework beco-
mes necessary. Consequently, any methodology in political science and interna-
tional relations must be ‘sensitive to the normative character of both subject and 
method (implicating theory), such that the traditional distinction between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’ gives way to an understanding of their intimate relationship’ (Dyer, 
1997, p. 28). If we assumed that only facts and not values or principles can be 
a valid subject of the scientific inquiry we would have to sacrifice the whole cri-
tical social and political theory which has a normative dimension, and this very 
dimension distinguishes it from positivistic sociology. The findings of politi-
cal science are not value-free; they lend support to some values and undermi-
ne others.
Defining normative theory and its role
Normative political theory is as old as reflection about politics and we can easily 
regard Plato and Aristotle as its founders. There are several aspects of their philo-
sophical reflection of politics (or practical philosophy) which build up a nor-
mative theory: there is no separation between ethics and politics (thus between
‘ought’ and ‘is’, they are mutually dependent), the nature of political theorizing is 
both descriptive (e.g. Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens) and prescriptive (Plato’s 
The Republica and The Laws, Aristotle’s Politics), politics has a teleological cha-
racter and as an activity is concerned with telos, which is primarily defined as the 
good life of the political community. Classical political theory was a predecessor 
of political science and for many centuries political theorizing had had mainly 
a normative character, but it was often a response to a certain empirical context. 
For instance, Jean Bodin’s concept of sovereignty was developed during his ser-
vice to the French monarchy and in a way justified the already developing system 
of governing. It was not, however, presented as a description of empirical phe-
nomena, but as a normative theory. In the concept of sovereignty Bodin found 
a principle upon which a political order should be based. Thus it can be said that 
‘political theories are shaped by the important cultural, intellectual, and political 
currents of their time and place, and it is natural to think of these currents as, in 
a sense, the “foundations” of a political theory’ (Moon, 2015, p. 1342).
This line of reasoning about the nature of political theory was addressed by 
Quentin Skinner in his two-volume Foundations of Modern Political Thought 
(1978), and in other writings. He argues that political theorizing is not, and can-
not be, an effort to answer perennial questions of political life, but is itself a form 
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of political activity, in which one draws on the cultural elements available in 
one’s society to advance and legitimate a position in ongoing controversies. Thus 
in order to understand what the authors of political texts were ‘doing in writing 
them’ (Skinner, 1978, xiii), we must recover ‘the normative vocabulary’ of the 
time within which an author’s ideas – even, or especially, when they extend or 
revise that vocabulary – are necessarily expressed. The study of political thought, 
in this view, must not only be contextual, but must be a ‘history of ideologies’ – 
in the sense of ‘discourses of legitimation’ (Skinner, 2006, p. 242, n. 5). In Foun-
dations of Modern Political Thought, for example, Skinner investigates ‘the acqui-
sition of the concept of the sovereign state, together with the corresponding idea 
that individual subjects are endowed with natural rights within and potentially 
against the state’ (Skinner, 2006, p. 237).
Our primary concern here, however, is not whether we accept the contextua-
list reading of political philosophy or not. The key question for our analysis con-
cerns the type of theory that political philosophy involves. In general, a positi-
ve social theory attempts to explain how the social world works in a value-free 
way, while a normative theory provides a value-based view about what the social 
world ought to be like or how it ought to work. The former describes and exa-
mines the existing social, political and economic structures while the latter pro-
poses goals and standards that should be achieved, or at least are desirable even 
if they cannot be achieved at the moment. Political theories provide a set of con-
cepts or propositions that explain political phenomena on the one hand and, on 
the other, normative principles for ordering political communities. These princi-
ples are often treated as having universal validity. Each political community can 
function on the basis of certain common standards shared by its members. A de-
scriptive social or political theory simply identifies and examines those standards
whereas a normative theory formulates statements as to what standards a politi-
cal community ought to follow or be based upon.
Normative theory is concerned with norms or normative principles. A nor-
mative principle can be defined as ‘a general directive that tells agents what (they 
ought, or ought not) to do’ (Cohen, 2003, p. 211). All our concepts cannot sim-
ply ‘describe’ reality; they also provide meaning to the social world of facts, val-
ues, norms, patterns, standards. Therefore apart from descriptive arguments for-
mulated by empirically minded political scientists there are also evaluative or 
prescriptive arguments formulated by theorists who are concerned with justifi-
cation of norms. Broadly conceived norms are regularities of certain phenome-
na. In the social and political context, norms can be understood descriptively 
as standards of behaviour of social and political action, or prescriptively as rea-
sons which dictate a certain choice of action. In ethics norms mean moral stan-
dards. A normative theory tries to determine what standards ought to be follo-
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wed in a political community (domestic or international). Normative statements 
refer to an ideal standard or model and this reference may involve a priori con-
cepts that establish standards by which judgments can be made. Norms deter-
mine the value of social phenomena and are the major point of reference in the 
process of judging social phenomena as desirable or undesirable. Because of the 
structure of our reasoning it can be suggested that ‘All our concepts have norma-
tive dimension […] once we look at the world as agents we cannot reach a pure 
non-normative core; this is part of the thorough unity of the world wrought out 
by bridging implications’ (Castañeda, 1988, p. 16). Normativity allows for que-
stioning the world we experience in order to render judgment on it so that we 
can say what measures are not being met, what standards are being overlooked. 
This is possible because of the clear autonomy of ‘what ought to be’ from ‘what 
is’ (Marti-Huang, 1987, p. 152) although the relationship of the two dimensions 
will always be a matter of controversy.
Normative theory, as any other theory, needs to address the question: what 
is a valid subject of scientific inquiry? According to the common distinction that 
has been made since at least the 1950s (e.g. in Bernard, 1950, p. 481) scientific 
social theory can be validated by reference to actual facts by ordinary inducti-
ve methods. Normative theory, however, since it does not refer to what actually 
exists but to what ought to exist, needs to be validated in a different way, by re-
ference to philosophical postulates, or in other words the postulates of practical 
reason (e.g. Kantian ethics), or by reference to some ontological and epistemo-
logical assumptions about the social and political world (e.g. certain objective 
standards discoverable through reason, such as natural rights) or other postula-
tes which evaluate what is by applying some objective norms that cannot be ve-
rified empirically. Although this objectivity can always be contingent, it belongs 
to the very structure of a normative argument which extrapolates empirical phe-
nomena to formulate value-oriented statements regarding the desirable structu-
re of these phenomena, their justification and evaluation against a certain ideal 
standard. For example, formulating substantive features of a democratic order, 
a normative democratic theory extrapolates from a purely descriptive account of 
democratic mechanisms and institutions. We can call this aspect of the norma-
tive argument a prescriptive function. Normative democratic theory can also fo-
cus on the justification of institutional democratic structures (e.g. constitutiona-
lism), providing reasons and not factual proofs. This can be called a justificatory 
function of a normative theory. Finally, normative democratic theory can evalu-
ate democratic structures against certain normative standards (e.g. substantive 
democratic norms) and this can be called an evaluative function. It can also play 
a more modest yet very important role of clarifying arguments and weighting 
values involved in political choices (Bauböck, 2008, p. 40).
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Another important aspect of a normative political theory is its function. It 
can be argued that normative social and political theory ‘preserves the inten-
tions of practical philosophy to rationally articulate a more adequate form of hu-
man existence and to enlighten them in its attainment’ (Benhabib, 1986, p. 5). 
The term ‘normative’ does not imply only something that ‘ought to be’, but re-
fers to norms and their centrality in the political realm. Normative theory en-
ables not only a firm grounding and understanding of existing norms, but also 
a critique of given norms and their sources. Normative analysis provides criti-
cal assessment of the assumptions and philosophical foundations of political ac-
tion and allows for the overcoming of the separation between politics and eth-
ics. The changing nature of the political creates much room for philosophical 
reflection on politics (Krauz-Mozer, 2011, p. 43) and especially on such issues 
as just war, responsibility for the environment, gender equality or the rights of 
the most disadvantaged. In light of critical normative theory that allows for crit-
ical reflection on the foundations of political science or international relations, 
these foundations can be viewed as ultimately contextual or contingent and
not absolute.
Klaus von Beyme argues that it is not possible to fully determine (identify) 
the philosophical foundations of contemporary normative theories (formulated
after the Second World War). They range from Thomism through conserva-
tive skepticism and they no longer have religious foundations (Beyme, 2007, 
p. 40). However, some common features of normative theories in the 20th cen-
tury can be identified: 1. A return to Aristotle and more broadly classical po-
litical philosophy (Arendt, Pangle, Voegelin, Strauss); 2. Interest in the histo-
ry of political ideas; 3. A clear ontological foundation that allows for objective 
truth; 4. In methodology, where scepticism towards abstract rational models and 
system theories prevails, some refer to topoi as a tool of formulating hypoth-
eses (Beyme, 2007, pp. 40–43). Beyme argues that normative theory is neces-
sary in order to reduce irrationalism in statements of what ‘ought’ to be (Bey-
me, 2007, p. 46) and acknowledges the role of political philosophy, not only in 
hypotheses building, but also in the final stage of political inquiry that involves 
conclusions on political action.
Normative theory can be prescriptive (referring to deontic modality) or de-
scriptive (referring to the actual circumstance of that modality). This double me-
aning gives normative theory a wide range of application as it can be employed 
to address particular practices which refer to norms (as desirable) or it can be 
used to address the way in which norms exist, function, and evolve.
A normative approach to the concept of the political focuses on a positive 
evaluation of the meaning of a valuable political order whereas a critical appro-
ach is meant to uncover injustice, tensions and contradictions of social stru-
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ctures (Minker, 2015, p. 59). Its ethical dimension, which became the source 
of criticism for many empirically-minded scholars, allows for an accommoda-
tion of fact-value distinction. It comes with the acknowledgment that our poli-
tical world is not only the world of facts, but also of values and value judgments. 
We would not be able to make sense of social facts without the ability to express 
meaningful statements as to what benefits human flourishing and well-being. 
One of the key institutions in today’s international relations, deeply embodied 
in the constitutions of most states, is the institution of human rights and their 
protection. Its justification can hardly be presented without a normative politi-
cal theory that prescribes the values which any decent (to use Rawls’ term) po-
litical community must observe. This minimal standard or goal since the end of 
the Second World War has been defined as protection of basic human rights in 
the light of the UN 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The langua-
ge of natural human rights was first used by political philosophers of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries and deeply influenced the two very first docu-
ments that invoke rights as fundamental constitutional principles, the American 
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen. Any descriptive or empirical theory of politics can only tell us how 
well basic human rights are respected in a given political context, but it cannot 
tell us why they should be protected in the first place.
The relationship between empirical research and normative 
theory
The common distinction in political science suggests that ‘one either studies 
‘‘democracy’’ or empirical instances of democracy, but not both’ (Gerring, Yes-
nowitz, 2006, p. 103). Theorists engage in a rigorous, philosophically informed 
normative study while empiricists engage in a rigorous, methodologically infor-
med empirical study. But does that mean that political philosophy and political 
research should be treated as separate entities? Or perhaps there is room for in-
teraction between the two. In recent decades an interesting debate has been con-
cerned with the very scope and orientation of normative political theory and its 
method. In particular, the debate has paid attention to the question of the proper 
‘place of empirical inquiry within the repertoire of the professional political the-
orist’ (Stears, 2005, p. 325) asking how far a political theorist should be sensitive 
to facts and attentive to the contexts and the feasibility of implementation with 
regard to prescriptive models. The key question between the two camps is this: 
must principles of justice be practical? (Weinberg, 2013, p. 331). Some scholars 
argue that normative theory must be closely linked with empirical realities and 
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consider non-ideal structures that hinder the implementation of ideals in the 
real world (Farrelly, 2007; Dupré, 2001).
John Gerring and Joshua Yesnowitz have summarised this position, stat-
ing that “Empirical study in the social sciences is meaningless if it has no nor-
mative import’ while ‘a normative argument without empirical support may be 
rhetorically persuasive or logically persuasive, but it will not have demonstrat-
ed anything about the world out there” (Gerring, Yesnowitz, 2006, p. 133). On 
this reading good social science must integrate both elements. Similarly, Ronald 
Beiner argues that ‘moral political commitments’ must be based on our knowl-
edge of what best satisfies worthy human ends or human longings (Beiner, 2016, 
p. 312). Rawl’s term ‘realistic utopia’ captures the view that normative political 
theory (political philosophy in his case) is concerned with both ideals and prac-
ticality (Rawls, 2001). Addressing the question of the practicality of political philo-
sophy, Justine Weinberg (2013, p. 330) argues that as such it has ‘two masters: 
knowledge and action.’ It is not only supposed to tell us what is true about justice, 
rights or authority, but also what to do in order to promote the desirable stan-
dards as prescribed by these principles. This understanding of political philo-
sophy conflates its very normative nature and pushes it too far in the empirical 
direction. Its limited validity can be seen in John Gray’s claim that ethics must be 
an empirical field freed from any a priori truths (Gray, 2000, p. 35). He seems to 
support this claim with his conviction that the only ethical position that can be 
defended is value pluralism which is a descriptive and not a normative theory. 
The incommensurability of values leaves us without any criterion or standard to 
judge and evaluate moral claims (Gray, 2000, p. 37).
Other political theorists have expressed certain reservations when it comes 
to the ‘practicality’ of a normative theory. Particularly illuminating seems to be 
Gerald Cohen’s refutation of constructivist accounts of justice which assume that 
principles must be at least to some extent affirmed by and grounded in facts (Co-
hen, 2003). Such position according to Cohen can be found in Rawls when he 
states that ‘Conceptions of justice must be justified by the conditions of our life 
as we know it or not at all’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 398). The main argument against 
such a position is the existence of ‘fact-insensitive normative principles’; in other 
words, principles that are not grounded in facts, such as statements about human 
beings, their rationality etc. (Cohen, 2003, p. 222). In any argument that involves 
normative principles we reach the stage at which there cannot be facts support-
ing our principles; they are either self-evident (e.g. the dignity of a human being) 
or must be taken for granted as true (e.g. Locke’s concept of the inalienable rights 
of the individual). Therefore ‘affirmations of fact-insensitive principle are logi-
cally prior to affirmations of principle that are made when factual information 
is brought to bear’ (Cohen, 2003, p. 227). Justification of principles in its stron-
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gest form is often deductive which means that in order to justify a principle (e.g. 
human rights) a more general, higher-level principle or norm is provided from 
which the first can be deducted (e.g. human dignity or human nature, or the 
categorical imperative), sometimes along with certain generalizations (Moon, 
2015). If these higher-level principles or first premises of a normative theory 
are supposed to provide justification they must be treated as self-evident, abso-
lute, universal and invariant. This raises obvious problems often noted by critics 
of any foundationalism as to the recognition of the non-arbitrary nature of such 
principles. An interesting response to this problem can be found in John Stew-
art Mill and his attempt to justify the greatest happiness principle or the princi-
ple of utility. Mill asserted that ‘Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to 
direct proof ’ (Mill, 2003, p. 12). It is our intellect that treats some considerations 
as self-evident and therefore worth upholding or not.
The fact that at least a certain part of a normative political theory cannot have 
any obvious reference to empirical phenomena reflects the very nature of norma-
tive theorizing and not its problems. And if indeed many works in political theory 
‘have ignored the findings of mainstream political scholars who strive to uncover 
the salient facts of political life, fleeting as those may be’ (Ricci, 1984, p. 321), this 
should not be taken as an argument against normative political theory.
Normative political theory and empirical political studies do not need to be 
put in two separate boxes and treated as competing approaches. As many stud-
ies suggest there is a need for both approaches in political science and their di-
alogue can increase our understanding of politics (Morrell, 1999, p. 293). Nor-
mative theory can guide empirical research while empirical research can have 
positive impact on normative theory (Bauböck, 2008, p. 40). The view prevail-
ing in the 1960s and 1970s that political theory has turned away from much po-
litical science and there is no compromise between the two (Kateb, 1977, p. 136) 
no longer stands. Instead, more and more political theories benefit from empiri-
cal research that explores the ways politics functions in the real world while em-
pirical research needs some kind of guidance when it comes to important ques-
tions, and justification. So, for instance, empirical studies of multiculturalism are 
often done in light of certain normative standards as to what the desirable mod-
el of coexistence between various cultural groups should be; they can test the 
applicability of such models and formulate hypotheses upon what does or does 
not function empirically and why. Normative philosophical accounts of multi-
culturalism proved quite influential in the 1990s, shaping debates on the sub-
ject not only in academia, but also in public life. As Will Kymlicka reminds us, 
Charles Taylor’s essay “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition” (1992) 
was translated into numerous languages and cited in discussions of multicultur-
alism not only in Paris or Tokyo, but also in the highlands of Bolivia (Kymlicka, 
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2010, p. 257). Major studies on the subject undertaken in the last two decades by 
Kymlicka are a good example of a dialogue between the two approaches. Nor-
mative theories of multiculturalism reflect certain facts and inform certain poli-
cies; this allows empirical researchers who deal with multicultural policies to use 
them. These policies cannot be seen as completely detached from certain moral 
standards which need to be delineated in the first place.
Another example is participatory democratic theory which starts with nor-
mative assumptions as to the value of active civic participation in a democratic
order, and can be further developed through empirical research that aims to ex-
plore the conditions that make such participation a viable option for citizens 
(Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2008). In this sense, the principles of political philosophy 
should be practical, which means that it should be able to tell us what needs to be 
done in order to make some principles a viable option. For example, what needs 
to be done or what conditions or opportunities need to be in place to make po-
litical participation a desirable goal for citizens. Thus theorists of participatory 
democracy might want to focus not only on opportunities for participation, but 
also on a more practical question of how those opportunities ought to be institu-
tionalized (Morrell, 1999, p. 294).
Not all of political philosophy or normative theory in international relations 
will have this practical goal. First of all there are some limits as to what norma-
tive theory may offer in terms of practical solutions (as they cannot be tested 
empirically in a laboratory). And secondly, normative theory shall retain its pre-
scriptive, justificatory and evaluative aspects as valuable in themselves no matter 
what its practical side might be.
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